作者： Richard Weitz 2012年12月11日 World Politics Review
The most interesting among them was the odd juxtaposition between Chinese policymakers' concern about the Asia pivot with their feeling that Washington’s domestic priorities and concerns in the Middle East will ultimately derail the planned strategic rebalancing of U.S. diplomatic and military resources toward the Asia-Pacific region.
The Chinese also insisted that their nonproliferation policies toward Iran and North Korea were close to those of the United States. Like Washington, they argued, Beijing supports a dual-track policy of sanctions and diplomacy, with the hope that a combination of such sticks and carrots will induce both Tehran and Pyongyang to curtail their proliferation-sensitive activities.
The Chinese diplomats further believed that the recent leadership transitions in both the U.S. and China will make it easier for the two countries to achieve a “new model” for their relationship. Through dialogue and cooperation, they believed that we could overcome distrust to avoid the so-called “rising power problem,” whereby China’s growing economic and military potential might trigger an American response that leads to a confrontation between the rising and currently dominant global powers.
That Chinese policymakers are paying close attention to the Asia pivot does not seem surprising. President Barack Obama has clearly resolved to make Asia the priority in America’s strategic calculations for the coming century. He sees himself as America’s first Asian president and has, like his other senior national security team, spent more time in East Asia than in any other region. To help reduce American commitments in Europe and the Middle East, he expects U.S. allies and partners in those regions to assume more of the burden of sustaining regional security, such as by strengthening their local defense capabilities and by assuming a more prominent diplomatic role in addressing regional developments such as domestic political transitions and regional economic recovery.
Meanwhile, Obama has also sought to encourage Asian countries, above all China but also Japan and South Korea, to apply their resources to promoting peace and development in other regions, as illustrated by his efforts to instill a more global focus to the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea. He especially believes that the U.S. needs China’s support to deal with the world’s most serious problems, including the domestic challenges of making the U.S. economy more competitive internationally as well as the global challenges of climate change and WMD proliferation.
Despite the Chinese diplomats’ claims, however, there are clear differences between how China and the United States deal with proliferation problems. It is true that, more than at any time in their history, China and the United States are pursuing similar nonproliferation goals within a shared set of institutions, rules and principles, ranging from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to less formal U.S.-led nonproliferation initiatives. And while disputes and concerns remain in certain areas, the general record of China and Russia regarding the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery has improved in the past 20 years. Over that time, Beijing has shown an increasing willingness to address U.S. concerns about its WMD-related policies. China has also joined a number of nonproliferation treaties and institutions, while adopting an expanding range of export controls that limit the sale of technologies that could potentially contribute to WMD proliferation. Especially in their declaratory policies, Chinese policymakers emphasize their desire to achieve mutually beneficial “win-win” outcomes that advance both Chinese and U.S. interests.
Yet, China has joined with Russia in leading international opposition against imposing rigorous sanctions on Iran, North Korea and other countries that have violated their nonproliferation commitments. In Iran and North Korea, Chinese companies have exploited the WMD-related penalties imposed by the U.N. and Western governments by “backfilling” contracts abandoned by departing foreign firms. And unlike Russia, China refuses to support let alone join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, which seeks to curtail the illicit spread of WMD, their technologies and materials, and the means of delivering them.
Although Chinese leaders have warned Tehran and Pyongyang against acquiring nuclear weapons, Chinese policymakers have stressed the value of engagement with, rather than punishment of, these proliferation-threatening regimes. Fundamentally, Chinese officials want to see changes in these countries’ policies rather than in their regimes.
As for the “rising power problem,” several factors make a deliberate war between China and the United States very unlikely at any time. First, unlike during the U.S. confrontations with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the China-U.S. rivalry lacks an ideological dimension.
Second, globalization has created deeper and wider economic ties between China and the United States than have ever existed in modern history between a rising power and the established power. A war between them would drive the global economy into a depression, taking both countries’ economies with it. The potential causes of conflict between the United States and China are limited, and, in the aggregate, both countries can gain more through cooperation than through competition.
Finally, both countries have nuclear weapons. They know that any military confrontation between them therefore risks escalating into a global nuclear war, bringing mutually assured destruction as well as mutually assured depression.
Nevertheless, U.S. officials are rightfully concerned about the implications of China’s risefor the regional and global balance of power and the effectiveness of U.S.-backed institutions. Historically, it is often difficult for established powers to accommodate a rising power. The lack of Chinese political and security transparency further complicates this global power transition by deepening uncertainties regarding Beijing’s goals and means.
Above all, it remains unclear how committed Chinese leaders will be to maintaining freedom of access to the global commons. Many Chinese leaders appear to have a 19th-century view of national sovereignty in a 21st-century world, where leaders accept that they must sacrifice some of their national freedom of action for the greater common goods of international peace and prosperity.
Fortunately, Chinese views on many of these issues still appear in flux, so dialogue sessions like the one I took part in at the Chinese Embassy offer us opportunities to dispel misunderstandings where they exist and to identify, if not necessarily resolve, genuine differences.
Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor. His weekly WPR column, Global Insights, appears every Tuesday.
資料來源：http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12559/global-insights-china-wary-but-skeptical-of-u-s-pivot-to-asia
美专家：中美极不可能开战 否则引爆全球核战
作者：2012年12月13日 环球网
美国世界政治评论网站12月11日发表华盛顿哈德逊研究院政治与军事分析中心主任、高级研究员理查德•怀兹博士文章称，中美两国极不可能爆发真正的战争，这是因为中美两国不存在意识形态分歧，其次全球化已经使中美经济关系空前深化，两国爆发战争会使全球经济陷入萧条。第三，中美两国潜在冲突点有限，合作比对抗更符合两国利益。最后，中美两国都有核武器，两国间爆发的任何军事对抗，都有可能会引爆全球核战，危及双方国家生存及经济发展。 怀兹博士参加了在中国驻华盛顿大使馆召开的一次全面对话会议，与会人员包括中国外交官和美国的中美关系专家。会议期间，中国外交官提出的一些问题引起了广泛关注。他指出，其中最令人感兴趣的是中国决策者对美国军事重心向亚太地区转移的关注，他们认为华盛顿在国内优先事项，以及其对中东的关注，最终会使美国的亚太再平衡战略偏离轨道。中方与会人员还坚称中国对伊朗和朝鲜的不扩散政策和美国类似。他们指出，与华盛顿相同，中国支持制裁与外交手段并行的双轨政策，希望“大棒”与“胡萝卜”能够限制德黑兰和平壤的核武努力。
中国外交官还认为，中美两国近来的领导换届，使两国可以更容易的打造中美关系“新模式”。他们认为，通过对话与合作，中美两国能够克服不信任，避免所谓的“崛起问题”，即中国日渐增强的经济与军事力量，会招来美国或会导致两国冲突的回应。
怀兹博士称，中国决策者对美国战略重心向亚太转移的密切关注并不奇怪。奥巴马总统明确表示，亚洲是美国新世纪战略考量的重心。他自认为是美国第一个“亚洲总统”，而且在东亚问题上花费的时间比其他任何地区都多。为了减少美国对欧洲和中东地区的承诺，他希望美国在那些地区的盟友能够担负起更多维持地区安全的责任，例如通过强化当地国防能力，以及在解决过渡和地区经济复苏等地区发展问题时扮演更加出色的外交角色。
与此同时，奥巴马还鼓励亚洲国家，尤其是中国、日本和朝鲜，利用自身资源，推动其他地区的和平与发展。奥巴马尤其认为，在解决世界上最棘手的问题时，美国需要中国的支持，包括使美国经济更具全球竞争力的国内挑战，以及气候变化和大规模杀伤性武器扩散等全球挑战。
怀兹博士指出，尽管中国外交官称中美在核武扩散问题上的立场与美国相同，但中美两国在处理这种问题是的做法仍有明显不同。的确，当前中美两国的防扩散目标空前相似。在过去的20年里，北京越来越愿意解决美国对其大规模杀伤性武器相关政策的担忧。中国还加入了大量的核不扩散条约和机构，同时推行范围更广的出口控制，限制可能会导致大规模杀伤性武器扩散的技术出口。中国决策者强调中国希望实现对中美两国利益都有利的互利“双赢”结果。
然而，怀兹博士指出，中国却和俄罗斯一起反对针对伊朗、朝鲜以及其他违背核不扩散承诺的国家施加制裁。伊朗和朝鲜，中国企业利用联合国和西方国家的大规模杀伤性武器相关处罚，把其他国家企业取而代之。而且，不同于俄罗斯，中国拒绝加入以美国为首的“防扩散安全倡议”——该倡议寻求遏制大规模杀伤性武器、相关技术与材料，及其运载平台的非法扩散。他还指出，尽管中国领导人警告德黑兰和平壤不要发展核武器，但中国决策者却更加强调与这些国家进行“接触”，而不是对他们施加制裁。从根本上讲,中国官员希望看到在这些国家的政策发生变化，而不是他们的国家政权发生变化。
至于“崛起问题”，怀兹博士指出，出于若干因素考虑，中美两国极不可能爆发真正的战争。首先，与美国与纳粹德国和苏联的对抗不同，中美敌对关系不存在意识形态分歧。其次，全球化已经使中美经济关系空前深化。身为新崛起的大国和世界上唯一超级大国，中美两国爆发战争会使全球经济陷入萧条，不利于两国经济发展。中美两国潜在冲突点有限，对于两个国家而言，合作比对抗更符合两国利益。最后，中美两国都有核武器，他们明白，两国间爆发的任何军事对抗，都有可能会引爆全球核战，危及双方国家生存及经济发展。
怀兹博士称，美国自然会非常关注中国的崛起对地区及全球力量平衡，以及对美国支持下的国际机构效力的影响。从历史上来看，老牌大国往往很难接受新崛起的国家。中国政治与安全透明度不足，导致世界对北京的目标与手段充满疑虑，这进一步复杂化了全球力量转换的过程。
