作者：2013年2月26日 综合整理
〈编按〉美国新任国务卿克里25日在伦敦与英国首相卡梅伦会谈，完成了他外交出访的“处女秀”。与高举重返亚太大旗的希拉里首次外访选在亚洲不同，克里的“第一次亲密接触”回到了欧洲。欧洲媒体欢呼“美国-欧盟轴心的复兴”；德国外长韦斯特韦勒称赞克里此行发出“重要的跨大西洋信号”。
尹永宽：The Asian Sleepwalkers
作者：尹永宽 2013年1月29日Project
Syndicate
不管东亚政治家和专家学者是否喜欢，该地区最近的国际关系与19世纪欧洲的实力平衡政治，而不是与当下欧洲的稳定状态更为相似。东亚民族主义和领土纠纷正在升级，同时也缺少有效的制度性机制促成安全合作。
美国重返亚太战略中的日本角色
朱锋：奥巴马政府“转身亚洲”战略与中美关系
作者：朱锋 2012年《现代国际关系》第4期
〔内容提要〕奥巴马政府“转身亚洲”战略的出台虽然不代表美对华政策发生了根本性转变，但美国随之采取的一系列军事和外交调整与行动表明，美已将战略重心转移至亚太地区，其对中国的认识与判断正在出现新的重大变化，已经将中国作为最主要的军事“假想敌”。
布热津斯基：强而不霸（Giants, but Not Hegemons）
作者：布热津斯基（Zbigniew Brzezinski） 2013年2月13日International Herald Tribune
Today, many fear that the emerging American-Chinese duopoly must inevitably lead to conflict. But I do not believe that wars for global domination are a serious prospect in what is now the Post-Hegemonic Age.
Obama’s Geopolitical China ‘Pivot’: The Pentagon Targets China
作者：威廉·恩道尔（F. William Engdahl） 2012年8月24日Global Research
翻譯：环球财经 2012年第12期
自苏联解体，冷战落幕20多年以来，美国庞大的军事开支不仅没有减少，历届美国国会和总统反而大幅度增加军事开支，以研发新武器系统，扩张在世界范围内永久军事基地，推动北约东扩，东扩的范围不仅仅限于前华约国家，更向俄罗斯的后院紧逼；同时，通过发动阿富汗战争以及相关活动，北约和美国的军事势力已深入亚洲腹地，向中国边境渗透。
翻譯：环球财经 2012年第12期
跨太平洋伙伴关系协定：中国崛起过程中的重大挑战
作者：李向阳《国际经济评论》2012年第2期
【内容提要】跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP）是美国“回归亚太”战略的重要组成部分，其动机既有经济又有政治方面的考虑，其中遏制中国崛起是一个不容否认的目标。以2011年亚太经合组织（APEC）峰会为标志，TPP已进入实质性谈判阶段。
帕内塔：美国的太平洋战调整（America’s Pacific Rebalance）
作者：Leon E. Panetta 2012年12月31日 Project Syndicate
2001年9月11日恐怖袭击后，美国军方历经十余年战争后已开始进行历史性的变革。我们结束了伊拉克战争；我们正在阿富汗有效落实过渡和裁军；我们在反恐斗争中严重削弱了“基地”组织的领导层。
约瑟夫奈：Work With China, Don’t Contain It
作者 约瑟夫·奈 2013年1月29日 纽约时报
CITING an escalating dispute over islands in the East China Sea, The Economist warned last week that “China and Japan are sliding toward war.” That assessment may be too alarmist, but the tensions have bolstered the efforts of some American analysts who have urged a policy to “contain” China.
Elizabeth C. Economy：华盛顿是北京所有问题的根源（Washington Source of All Beijing’s Problems）
作者 易明（Elizabeth C. Economy） 2012年9月5日 Council Foreign Relations
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s swing through Asia has been marked by a revelation in Beijing: the source of all China’s problems with its neighbors is the United States.
America’s Pivot: One Big Contradiction
作者 Justin Logan 2013年1月25日 The Diplomat.
Particularly among Asia scholars, there is broad support in Washington for a pivot to Asia in general, and U.S. China policy in particular. Unfortunately, there are two central flaws in U.S. Asia policy that promise big problems for America down the road.
基辛格：The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations-Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity
作者 Henry A. Kissinger 2012 年3/4月 Foreign Affairs
On January 19, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement at the end of Hu's visit to Washington. It proclaimed their shared commitment to a "positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship." Each party reassured the other regarding his principal concern, announcing, "The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region."
倪峰：美国“重返”亚洲及其评估
作者：倪峰 2012年1月中国社会科学院美国研究所《美国战略研究简报》
2009年7月，当美国国务卿希拉里在曼谷机场喊出“美国回来了”的口号时，一场新的超级博弈拉开了帷幕。从那时起，在亚洲国际舞台，远在大洋彼岸的美国的身影变得颇为抢眼。美国总统和外交、国防官员，像“走马灯”一样穿梭于亚洲各地。浩浩荡荡的美国舰群，不断在亚洲海域炫耀武力。对这一地区的各种争端, 无论是“天安号事件” 、“钓鱼岛事件” ，还是“南海争端” ，美国都积极介入。所有这一系列举动正在亚太地区持续发酵，深刻地影响着我国的周边安全和发展环境。
李侃如：The American Pivot to Asia
作者：李侃如（Kenneth G. Lieberthal） 2011年12月21日The Brookings Institution
The sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il drives home the importance of being able to work not only with U.S. allies but also with China in managing Asia's key threats. This is what makes striking the right balance in America's overall strategy toward Asia so vital.
The Obama administration's overall posture toward Asia has in fact evolved considerably over the course of the past couple of years. President Barack Obama laid out the result in its fullest form last month, as he traveled to Honolulu, Australia, and Indonesia for a series of major meetings. The message of this remarkable trip warrants careful examination, as it articulated an integrated diplomatic, military, and economic strategy that stretches from the Indian subcontinent through Northeast Asia -- and one that can profoundly shape the U.S.-China relationship. The core message: America is going to play a leadership role in Asia for decades to come.
The U.S. media portrayed this message as directed solely at confronting China in Asia, but it is in fact much more complex than that. How realistic is the strategy the president articulated, and how is it likely to affect U.S.-China relations and the roles of both countries in Asia? Does America have the resources to make good on the rhetoric concerning this historic "pivot"?
The U.S. media portrayed this message as directed solely at confronting China in Asia, but it is in fact much more complex than that. How realistic is the strategy the president articulated, and how is it likely to affect U.S.-China relations and the roles of both countries in Asia? Does America have the resources to make good on the rhetoric concerning this historic "pivot"?
What Has Changed?
Obama came into office as avowedly "the first Pacific president," convinced that George W. Bush's administration had paid too little attention to Asian regional issues and that the United States should restore and then enhance its traditional level of engagement there. Efforts accelerated as China's Asia policy became more hard edged during 2010 and as, during 2011, the United States' military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly declined.
Especially during 2010, the United States did not hesitate to respond to Chinese heavy-handedness in the region. In reaction to North Korea's test of a nuclear device and then launch of deadly provocations against the South, the Obama administration unequivocally supported Seoul, pressured China strongly to rein in Pyongyang, and against China's strong objections carried out naval exercises in the Yellow Sea to serve as a warning to North Korea.
In both Northeast Asia and the South China Sea, the Obama administration formally affirmed its neutrality in territorial disputes involving China but adopted substantive positions that predictably raised hackles in Beijing. When Japan detained a Chinese fishing-boat captain after an incident in the territorial waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the State Department confirmed that the U.S.-Japan alliance covers these waters because the islands are under the effective administrative control of Japan.
Renewed contentiousness over conflicting territorial claims by various littoral countries in the South China Sea led Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in mid-2010 to affirm an American vital interest in freedom of navigation in this region and in keeping the region open for normal commercial activities. At the same time, the secretary stated that the United States would be willing to facilitate a collaborative process for addressing the territorial claims and that the United States believes that all maritime claims must be supported fully by claims to land features. China bristled at the suspicion that Washington was inserting itself into these territorial issues and made clear that Beijing could see no threat that had arisen to freedom of navigation in the region.
In these and other instances, during 2010 the United States made discrete responses to various Chinese initiatives that were seen as potentially leveraging China's economic power to achieve diplomatic and security gains in the region. These responses were combined with very active bilateral U.S.-China diplomacy to keep the U.S.-China relationship on track and to manage expectations on both sides. A successful state visit for Chinese President Hu Jintao in Washington in January 2011 indicated that this combination of firmness on defined issues and active bilateral diplomacy had left the bilateral U.S.-China relationship on reasonably solid footing.
Against this background, the president's November 2011 Asia trip highlighted that U.S. policy has now taken a significant step forward in four areas:
Multilateral organizations. Over the past decade China invested substantial efforts in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN+3 (ASEAN, plus China, Japan, and South Korea), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Beijing negotiated a free trade agreement with ASEAN that provided for generous "early harvest" measures in the mid-2000s; the full agreement came into effect in 2010. This agreement, of course, excluded the United States. Beijing also supported the ARF as the key regional security forum, possibly because the ARF had demonstrated over many years that it would operate wholly by consensus and would not take up difficult specific issues.
Against this background, Obama in November 2011 brought to fruition his decisions to support decisively two different multilateral organizations. On the economic and trade side, the president declared that America hopes by December 2012 to see the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), now being negotiated, become a high-quality trade and investment platform that will include the major economies of the Asia-Pacific. The TPP is being structured around principles America champions in terms of transparency, protection of intellectual property, labor rights, environmental protection, and so forth (these could be considered to be "WTO plus"). While Obama noted that all who accept its principles will be welcome to join, the TPP principles differ greatly from those that guide most Chinese actions in the economic and trade arena. China is not among the initial group of countries negotiating to establish the TPP.
On the security side, America formally joined the East Asia Summit (EAS), and Obama used his inaugural participation to steer this new body toward focusing on difficult, concrete security issues in the region, especially maritime security. This was not at all to Beijing's liking, but most EAS participants supported the overall American approach.
In short, Obama moved boldly to shift the center of gravity among the key multilateral organizations in Asia, favoring those that include the United States and leading them to take approaches favored by Washington but are neuralgic for Beijing.
Economics and trade. The Obama administration had a disappointing record on trade issues during its first two-and-a-half years in office. But in early November 2011 it finally achieved ratification of the free trade agreement with South Korea, and it then, as noted above, turned its focus to developing the TPP as a new trade and investment platform in the Asia-Pacific. This pair of initiatives has thrust Asia back into the center of U.S. economic and trade initiatives, in line with Obama's oft-repeated assertion that there is no region as vital as Asia to America's future economic prosperity. All this came amid rising economic and trade tensions with China -- tensions that are unlikely to subside during the coming year of electoral politics in Washington and succession politics in Beijing.
Security. Obama declared unequivocally on this trip that he will protect America's Asian security investments from any future cutbacks in overall U.S. military spending. In Australia, moreover, he signed an agreement to allow rotational deployments of 2,500 marines in Darwin. Following a trip by new Defense Secretary Leon Panetta a few weeks earlier to the region, the president left no doubt that the U.S. military and broader security focus was now shifting from Iraq and Afghanistan to Asia and that this new posture will remain at the top of America's security priorities and will be protected from any future defense cuts.
Democracy. A global democracy agenda had not been a prominent part of Obama's tenure, but this changed significantly with the 2011 Arab Spring. The president made clear on this trip that America will lead in Asia in promoting democracy and human rights, declaring in Australia that, "Other models have been tried and they have failed -- fascism and communism, rule by one man and rule by committee. And they failed for the same simple reason: They ignore the ultimate source of power and legitimacy -- the will of the people." At his final stop, Obama announced that Hillary Clinton would visit Burma (Myanmar) in early December -- the first U.S. secretary of state in 50 years to do so -- to take the temperature of new reformist stirrings there and encourage progress toward more democratic governance. The new comprehensive strategy, in short, elevated the democratic component of American diplomacy in Asia.
Most of the specific initiatives unveiled on the president's November 2011 trip had their antecedents in 2010 or before. But whereas previously the United States selectively pushed back when it objected to Chinese actions and focused great attention on managing the overall U.S.-China relationship, the November trip marked a significant shift. Washington is still very much focused on sustaining a constructive U.S.-China relationship, but it has now brought disparate elements together in a strategically integrated fashion that explicitly affirms and promises to sustain American leadership throughout Asia for the foreseeable future.
China's Perceptions
China, not surprisingly, is worried about these new developments. They in many ways reinforce China's abiding suspicions about the United States. In Chinese eyes, the United States has always been concerned primarily with protecting its own global dominance -- which perforce means doing everything it can to retard or disrupt China's rise. That America lost its stride in the global financial crisis and the weak recovery since then while China in 2010 became the world's second-largest economy has only increased Beijing's concerns about Washington's determination to postpone the day when China inevitably surpasses the United States to become the world's most powerful country.
Beijing, for example, sees basically hostile American efforts in the following spheres: promoting dissent in China in order to create instability that America can then fan via cyber activities into upheaval that will bring down the Chinese Communist Party's rule; pressing China to revalue its currency so as to increase destabilizing unemployment in China and direct Americans' attention away from the United States' own failures; creating problems for China by fanning fears about Beijing's intentions among its neighbors and encouraging those, such as Vietnam, that have traditionally harbored deep suspicions of Chinese ambitions; forging cooperation among countries -- especially the major democracies -- in Asia to create obstacles to China's achieving its rightful role as the major power in the region; challenging China's model of development as an alternative to the tarnished Western democratic model; and using measures such as the formation of the TPP to reduce the scope for internationalization of the renminbi, which China thinks is an important step in reining in America's abuse of the dollar's role as the global reserve currency. In sum, the president's Asia-wide strategy and some of the rhetoric accompanying it played directly into the perception of many Chinese that all American actions are a conspiracy to hold down or actually disrupt China's rise.
China's leaders retain enough respect for American strength and capabilities that Obama's self-assured declaration of America's ongoing leadership role in Asia -- backed by ample evidence of comprehensive U.S. strategic thinking and diplomacy -- has at the same time at least raised the unwelcome possibility for Beijing of a significantly new context for China's own regional strategy.
What Will Happen?
The American press portrayed the Obama trip as affirming American leadership of Asia, challenging and trumping China at every turn. The fact that the United States' initiatives apparently received warm vocal support from nearly all major countries at the East Asia Summit reinforced this perception. But the reality is more complex, both as to what the president sought to do and as to the likely results.
A more complex U.S. strategy. The Obama administration does not seek to confront China across the board. Rather, it has adopted a two-pronged approach: to reaffirm and strengthen cooperative ties with China; and to establish a strong and credible American presence across Asia to both encourage constructive Chinese behavior and to provide confidence to other countries in the region that they need not yield to potential Chinese regional hegemony.
The administration is thus continuing to make focused efforts to develop close personal ties between the key top officials in Washington and Beijing. Obama has met with Chinese President Hu 10 times (including their meeting in Honolulu) and with Premier Wen Jiabao repeatedly. Clinton has made a special effort to engage her chief Chinese interlocutor, Dai Bingguo, on a personal level, regularly holding informal meetings with him that last for hours. And Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has established very close communications with his counterpart, Vice Premier Wang Qishan.
In these private meetings the spirit has been one of explaining each side's positions in terms of more than formal talking points in order to gain mutual understanding and increase mutual trust. The starting point has been mutual respect and recognition of the deep interconnected interests between China and the United States. These closed-door discussions have thus been designed to lessen the chances of unnecessary Sino-U.S. hostility. This quiet dimension of bilateral diplomacy seeks to manage U.S.-China tensions going forward and to set the tone and agenda for the many regular U.S.-China meetings across the two governments throughout the course of any given year.
China's responses. China was by all accounts surprised at the scope and detail of the American tour de force in November. Its initial reaction has been mild, possibly in part because of private assurances received during meetings between the top leaders and also in part because of the political succession this coming year in Beijing. The Hu leadership wants to avoid any serious deterioration in U.S.-China relations and very likely does not want to generate a major internal review of U.S.-China relations during this very sensitive political year.
However, China's leaders also do not want to fall seriously behind popular nationalist sentiment if that sentiment mushrooms over perceived American efforts to prevent a rising China from assuming its rightful place in Asia. This sentiment could increase pressure on the national leadership to push back against the assertion of America primacy in China's own backyard and to remind the United States of the changing real balance of power in Asia. Possibilities include, inter alia, escalation of tensions in general, reduced cooperation on issues such as sanctions against Iran and dealing with the unfolding succession in North Korea, and increased incidents in China's exclusive economic zone, none of which can be ruled out. Each can produce its own escalation of friction and distrust in U.S.-China relations. The military's role in Chinese politics is very murky but could also factor into these responses during this succession year. The Chinese succession thus can potentially move the situation in either direction, depending on internal dynamics there. Preventing a turn for the worse will require active, sustained, and carefully calibrated American diplomatic efforts.
Internal administration shift. There is a relevant internal administration dynamic at play that is more difficult to pin down but may prove consequential. The Obama administration's China policy from its earliest days was shaped especially by the close cooperation between Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg and the senior director for East Asia on the National Security Council, Jeffrey Bader. These were the first two top officials dealing with China to be in place in 2009, and they developed very effective cooperation to maintain the leadership of the White House especially on China but also on related broader Asian policies.
From late 2009 onward, there was a different strand of thinking in the State Department, supported by some in the Pentagon, that sought a tougher stance toward China and was more prepared to warn others in the region to be worried about China's growing capabilities and to band together to constrain Chinese initiatives. These two streams of policy were not in sharp conflict, but each side sought consciously to shape overall American policy and often proffered different tactical advice as various issues arose.
Messrs. Steinberg and Bader left the government in the spring of 2011. With their departures, there is no China specialist at the level of bureau chief or above at the State Department, the National Security Council, or the Pentagon. The White House briefing provided to journalists before the president's departure on his Asia trip more fully embraced the rhetoric (such as declaring an American "pivot" to Asia) and approach of those in the State Department who have sought a tougher line than at any time previously in the Obama administration. If this change in personnel has produced a substantive change in White House policy, that can prove to be a very significant development over time as new issues arise.
In this connection, it may be significant that Obama never uttered the term "pivot" during his Asia trip, and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon speaks in terms of "re-balancing" rather than making a "pivot." Clinton, by contrast, has repeatedly termed America's policy a "pivot to Asia."
Top Chinese officials have for a substantial time clearly perceived the differences within the U.S. government noted above and may react accordingly to signs that the tougher line has now won out.
American credibility. A tougher line may in fact produce more constructive Chinese behavior if it convinces Beijing that America retains the capacity to lead in Asia over the long run and is willing to encourage China's ongoing development so long as that does not produce behavior that challenges America's overall position or vital interests in the region. China's leaders are, after all, very pragmatic. They are unlikely to "take on" the United States if America has adopted a strategically coherent Asia strategy that is widely respected and viewed as credible in the region.
Rhetoric and diplomacy, after all, can shape perceptions and expectations and thus are important determinants of foreign-policy outcomes. But over time credibility is crucial, and credibility requires demonstrably having the resources and capabilities to implement the overall strategy over the long run.
In this context, it is striking that Obama and Clinton talked in Asia as if Asians did not view the global financial crisis as "made in America," as if the American system of democracy has recently been performing splendidly, and as if the American military had all the resources necessary to sustain any type of deployment Washington wishes across the vast Pacific region. But none of these is true.
The biggest question in Asia is whether America will bounce back from its current fiscal crisis and soon get onto a path to fiscal health and future strength. The political meltdown over raising the debt ceiling in August 2011 did enormous damage to America's standing in Asia because it generated such a strong negative signal on exactly this issue. As the president was laying out his strategy toward Asia in November, the congressional "supercommittee" was failing to reach even a minimal agreement to present to the Congress as a whole -- a failure that was announced within days of the president's return to Washington.
There thus may have been more than a little wishful thinking in the president's rhetoric during his November trip. While the president indicated that all countries would be welcome to join in Asian prosperity if they accepted the high standards being developed for the TPP, the reality is that at present it is China and not the United States that is the largest trade partner for every major economy in the region, and China does not operate according to these standards. No Asian country appears willing to do anything to jeopardize its economic ties with the rapidly growing Chinese economy, especially at a time of weak American growth and a very uncertain economic prognosis for Europe.
The U.S. military, moreover, is facing potential total budget reductions of over $1 trillion over the coming 10 years. Most Asian governments wonder whether this will, despite current protestations, adversely affect American military capabilities -- and the United States' willingness to use them -- in Asia. China's military, far weaker than that of the United States, appears set to enjoy double-digit annual budget increases for years to come.
In short, a tremendously important factor shaping the future American role in Asia will be how well the United States does in repairing its domestic economy and in demonstrating that, as has happened so often in U.S. history, the American system can bounce back from severe domestic problems stronger than ever before due to the changes the crisis has forced America to adopt.
China's trajectory. There is also the matter of China's own prospects. There is an impression when discussing Beijing's international role that China's growth momentum is unstoppable and that its system is on very firm ground domestically. But both of these are in fact in question. Beijing has already made clear that it must change its development model, as the model that has proved so successful in the past few decades has run its course and is now increasingly generating outcomes -- extreme disparities in wealth, pervasive problems in product and food safety, increasing corruption, catastrophic environmental degradation, decreasing returns to investment, widespread feeling that the system itself has become unfair, and so forth -- that are economically unsustainable and socially destabilizing. But there is sparse evidence to give confidence that the very tough political decisions required to effect this change -- decisions that will challenge vested interests in the corporate world and among some powerful local leaders -- will in fact be made during this time of succession politics in Beijing.
Indeed, the protracted nature of the succession warrants pessimism about substantial domestic reforms before about 2014, if then. Yet, China's political stability cannot be assured without the types of changes in the political system that have become very difficult -- perhaps too difficult -- to make. Should China experience major political unrest or a sharp disruption in its growth momentum, perceptions throughout the Asia-Pacific will shift in ways that can easily affect attitudes toward China's role and the U.S.-China balance in the region.
A pivot too far?
The declaration of America's strategic pivot to Asia announced in November clearly sought to generate confidence in America's future leadership role in this region and respect for Washington's capacity to orchestrate this very impressive diplomatic tour de force. Many in Asia have been worrying about American decline. Obama projected American optimism, principles, determination, and leadership.
This strategy has substantial potential benefits, but it is not nearly as certain a trumpet as the president and Secretary Clinton made it sound. Most importantly, the United States will not have the resources and capacity to fully meet the president's promises unless it addresses its domestic fiscal and related political problems far more effectively than recent experiences suggest is likely. Putting America's domestic house in order is a necessary condition for the success of the new Asia strategy. In addition, the Chinese may respond in increasingly challenging ways, especially as their domestic politics intrude.
Most countries in Asia, moreover, are determined to continue to expand their economic and trade relations with China even as they worry that Beijing will leverage its growing economic clout for diplomatic and security advantage. While they therefore want the United States to prevent China from successfully taking advantage of others in the region, no country wants to see a tension-filled U.S.-China relationship that creates pressure for everyone else to choose sides. They rather want to be able to maintain equally effective relations with China and the United States and to derive benefit from both the cooperation and the competition between the two giants in the region. The notion that the United States will shape the major outcomes in the region because countries there will welcome clear American leadership misunderstands these more complicated calculations around the region.
The United States had been responding to entreaties from its friends and allies in Asia by taking actions primarily on the diplomatic and security side until well into 2011. This ran the immediate risk that some countries, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, might succeed in dragging the United States into their own territorial disputes with China, a situation that Washington had wisely taken care to avoid in the past. More fundamentally, this broad approach ran the longer-term risk that Asia will increasingly become a cost center for the United States (providing security is expensive), while the region will continue to serve as a growing profit center for China (due to its vast economic engagement). Given America's fiscal plight, that is not a comforting or possibly even a sustainable trajectory.
The Obama administration's pivot to Asia prospectively establishes a more balanced economic, diplomatic, and security approach. The recent U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement ratification and efforts to create the TPP are very important steps in this direction. But this new integrated Asia strategy risks overreach by creating expectations that Washington will not be able to meet, feeding suspicions in China that may lead to a far more irascible U.S.-China relationship, and assuming goals among other Asian countries that miss their more complex perceptions of American prospects and strategies in the region.
It is therefore very important for American officials to keep tight control of their rhetoric so as to avoid unnecessary distrust and tension as they flesh out details of U.S. strategy. During the critical period coming up with North Korea, for example, U.S.-China communication and cooperation can prove extremely important. To the extent that American rhetoric feeds strategic distrust in Beijing, such cooperation on the issue of North Korea, which China regards as a major security concern, will be far more difficult to achieve.
While significant progress in U.S.-China relations is unlikely during the coming year because of the succession/election taking place in both countries, therefore, the United States should not neglect the importance of enhancing the relationship with Beijing as part of any successful regional and global strategy. No amount of success among other countries in Asia will in itself produce the regional results that Obama seeks.
Indeed, both the United States and China must keep in mind that they are best served by adopting positions that engender a healthy respect in the other capital concerning capabilities and goals so that neither acts rashly and both have strong incentives to cooperate where possible. As of now, it is too soon to tell whether Obama's November trip has laid the basis for a truly more balanced, sustainable strategy in Asia.
美国“重返”亚太与俄罗斯的应对
作者：程春华 《南京政治学院学报》2012年4期第65～71页
【内容提要】俄罗斯学者认为美国“重返”①亚太的动因主要有促进美国经济复苏、遏制中国、保持经济领导地位、平衡亚太力量对比、履行对盟友责任、在亚太保持主导地位等方面的需要，在一定程度上反映了美国为维护既得利益与旧的世界秩序，而对新兴国家进行的围堵。俄罗斯学者指出，美国“重返”亚太触犯了俄罗斯利益，对俄美关系、中美关系都有损害，加深俄美、俄中之间的“战略互疑”，使亚太局势更加复杂和不稳定。
Hillary Clinton：美国的太平洋世纪（America's Pacific Century）
作者：Hillary Clinton 2011年11月FOREIGN POLICY
The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action.
As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region.
We are modernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia -- and our commitment on this is rock solid -- while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. For example, the United States will be deploying littoral combat ships to Singapore, and we are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together. And the United States and Australia agreed this year to explore a greater American military presence in Australia to enhance opportunities for more joint training and exercises. We are also looking at how we can increase our operational access in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region and deepen our contacts with allies and partners.
As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans -- the Pacific and the Indian -- that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world's population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia.
At a time when the region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, U.S. commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has paid off many times over -- and continues to do so. The time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power, a strategic course set by President Barack Obama from the outset of his administration and one that is already yielding benefits.
With Iraq and Afghanistan still in transition and serious economic challenges in our own country, there are those on the American political scene who are calling for us not to reposition, but to come home. They seek a downsizing of our foreign engagement in favor of our pressing domestic priorities. These impulses are understandable, but they are misguided. Those who say that we can no longer afford to engage with the world have it exactly backward -- we cannot afford not to. From opening new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and security at home. For more than six decades, the United States has resisted the gravitational pull of these "come home" debates and the implicit zero-sum logic of these arguments. We must do so again.
Beyond our borders, people are also wondering about America's intentions -- our willingness to remain engaged and to lead. In Asia, they ask whether we are really there to stay, whether we are likely to be distracted again by events elsewhere, whether we can make -- and keep -- credible economic and strategic commitments, and whether we can back those commitments with action. The answer is: We can, and we will.
Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region's key players.
Just as Asia is critical to America's future, an engaged America is vital to Asia's future. The region is eager for our leadership and our business -- perhaps more so than at any time in modern history. We are the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades -- patrolling Asia's sea lanes and preserving stability -- and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth. We have helped integrate billions of people across the region into the global economy by spurring economic productivity, social empowerment, and greater people-to-people links. We are a major trade and investment partner, a source of innovation that benefits workers and businesses on both sides of the Pacific, a host to 350,000 Asian students every year, a champion of open markets, and an advocate for universal human rights.
President Obama has led a multifaceted and persistent effort to embrace fully our irreplaceable role in the Pacific, spanning the entire U.S. Government. It has often been a quiet effort. A lot of our work has not been on the front pages, both because of its nature -- long-term investment is less exciting than immediate crises -- and because of competing headlines in other parts of the world.
As Secretary of State, I broke with tradition and embarked on my first official overseas trip to Asia. In my seven trips since, I have had the privilege to see firsthand the rapid transformations taking place in the region, underscoring how much the future of the United States is intimately intertwined with the future of the Asia-Pacific. A strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to secure and sustain America's global leadership. The success of this turn requires maintaining and advancing a bipartisan consensus on the importance of the Asia-Pacific to our national interests; we seek to build upon a strong tradition of engagement by presidents and secretaries of state of both parties across many decades. It also requires smart execution of a coherent regional strategy that accounts for the global implications of our choices.
What does that regional strategy look like? For starters, it calls for a sustained commitment to what I have called "forward-deployed" diplomacy. That means continuing to dispatch the full range of our diplomatic assets -- including our highest-ranking officials, our development experts, our interagency teams, and our permanent assets -- to every country and corner of the Asia-Pacific region. Our strategy will have to keep accounting for and adapting to the rapid and dramatic shifts playing out across Asia. With this in mind, our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.
By virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic. That is the touchstone of our efforts in all these areas.
Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific. They have underwritten regional peace and security for more than half a century, shaping the environment for the region's remarkable economic ascent. They leverage our regional presence and enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges.
As successful as these alliances have been, we can't afford simply to sustain them -- we need to update them for a changing world. In this effort, the Obama Administration is guided by three core principles. First, we have to maintain political consensus on the core objectives of our alliances. Second, we have to ensure that our alliances are nimble and adaptive so that they can successfully address new challenges and seize new opportunities. Third, we have to guarantee that the defense capabilities and communications infrastructure of our alliances are operationally and materially capable of deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors.
The alliance with Japan, the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region, demonstrates how the Obama Administration is giving these principles life. We share a common vision of a stable regional order with clear rules of the road -- from freedom of navigation to open markets and fair competition. We have agreed to a new arrangement, including a contribution from the Japanese Government of more than $5 billion, to ensure the continued enduring presence of American forces in Japan, while expanding joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities to deter and react quickly to regional security challenges, as well as information sharing to address cyberthreats. We have concluded an Open Skies Agreement that will enhance access for businesses and people-to-people ties, launched a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific, and been working hand in hand as the two largest donor countries in Afghanistan.
Similarly, our alliance with South Korea has become stronger and more operationally integrated, and we continue to develop our combined capabilities to deter and respond to North Korean provocations. We have agreed on a plan to ensure successful transition of operational control during wartime and anticipate successful passage of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. And our alliance has gone global, through our work together in the G-20 and the Nuclear Security Summit and through our common efforts in Haiti and Afghanistan.
We are also expanding our alliance with Australia from a Pacific partnership to an Indo-Pacific one, and indeed a global partnership. From cybersecurity to Afghanistan to the Arab Awakening to strengthening regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific, Australia's counsel and commitment have been indispensable. And in Southeast Asia, we are renewing and strengthening our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, increasing, for example, the number of ship visits to the Philippines and working to ensure the successful training of Filipino counterterrorism forces through our Joint Special Operations Task Force in Mindanao. In Thailand -- our oldest treaty partner in Asia -- we are working to establish a hub of regional humanitarian and disaster relief efforts in the region.
As we update our alliances for new demands, we are also building new partnerships to help solve shared problems. Our outreach to China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries is all part of a broader effort to ensure a more comprehensive approach to American strategy and engagement in the region. We are asking these emerging partners to join us in shaping and participating in a rules-based regional and global order.
One of the most prominent of these emerging partners is, of course, China. Like so many other countries before it, China has prospered as part of the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build and works to sustain. And today, China represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage. This calls for careful, steady, dynamic stewardship, an approach to China on our part that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and interests.
We all know that fears and misperceptions linger on both sides of the Pacific. Some in our country see China's progress as a threat to the United States; some in China worry that America seeks to constrain China's growth. We reject both those views. The fact is that a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America. We both have much more to gain from cooperation than from conflict. But you cannot build a relationship on aspirations alone. It is up to both of us to more consistently translate positive words into effective cooperation -- and, crucially, to meet our respective global responsibilities and obligations. These are the things that will determine whether our relationship delivers on its potential in the years to come. We also have to be honest about our differences. We will address them firmly and decisively as we pursue the urgent work we have to do together. And we have to avoid unrealistic expectations.
Over the last two-and-a-half years, one of my top priorities has been to identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China's active efforts in global problem-solving. This is why Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and I launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the most intensive and expansive talks ever between our governments, bringing together dozens of agencies from both sides to discuss our most pressing bilateral issues, from security to energy to human rights.
We are also working to increase transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation or miscues between our militaries. The United States and the international community have watched China's efforts to modernize and expand its military, and we have sought clarity as to its intentions. Both sides would benefit from sustained and substantive military-to-military engagement that increases transparency. So we look to Beijing to overcome its reluctance at times and join us in forging a durable military-to-military dialogue. And we need to work together to strengthen the Strategic Security Dialogue, which brings together military and civilian leaders to discuss sensitive issues like maritime security and cybersecurity.
As we build trust together, we are committed to working with China to address critical regional and global security issues. This is why I have met so frequently -- often in informal settings -- with my Chinese counterparts, State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, for candid discussions about important challenges like North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and developments in the South China Sea.
On the economic front, the United States and China need to work together to ensure strong, sustained, and balanced future global growth. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the United States and China worked effectively through the G-20 to help pull the global economy back from the brink. We have to build on that cooperation. U.S. firms want fair opportunities to export to China's growing markets, which can be important sources of jobs here in the United States, as well as assurances that the $50 billion of American capital invested in China will create a strong foundation for new market and investment opportunities that will support global competitiveness. At the same time, Chinese firms want to be able to buy more high-tech products from the United States, make more investments here, and be accorded the same terms of access that market economies enjoy. We can work together on these objectives, but China still needs to take important steps toward reform. In particular, we are working with China to end unfair discrimination against U.S. and other foreign companies or against their innovative technologies, remove preferences for domestic firms, and end measures that disadvantage or appropriate foreign intellectual property. And we look to China to take steps to allow its currency to appreciate more rapidly, both against the dollar and against the currencies of its other major trading partners. Such reforms, we believe, would not only benefit both our countries (indeed, they would support the goals of China's own five-year plan, which calls for more domestic-led growth), but also contribute to global economic balance, predictability, and broader prosperity.
Of course, we have made very clear, publicly and privately, our serious concerns about human rights. And when we see reports of public-interest lawyers, writers, artists, and others who are detained or disappeared, the United States speaks up, both publicly and privately, with our concerns about human rights. We make the case to our Chinese colleagues that a deep respect for international law and a more open political system would provide China with a foundation for far greater stability and growth -- and increase the confidence of China's partners. Without them, China is placing unnecessary limitations on its own development.
At the end of the day, there is no handbook for the evolving U.S.-China relationship. But the stakes are much too high for us to fail. As we proceed, we will continue to embed our relationship with China in a broader regional framework of security alliances, economic networks, and social connections.
Among key emerging powers with which we will work closely are India and Indonesia, two of the most dynamic and significant democratic powers of Asia, and both countries with which the Obama administration has pursued broader, deeper, and more purposeful relationships. The stretch of sea from the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca to the Pacific contains the world's most vibrant trade and energy routes. Together, India and Indonesia already account for almost a quarter of the world's population. They are key drivers of the global economy, important partners for the United States, and increasingly central contributors to peace and security in the region. And their importance is likely to grow in the years ahead.
President Obama told the Indian parliament last year that the relationship between India and America will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, rooted in common values and interests. There are still obstacles to overcome and questions to answer on both sides, but the United States is making a strategic bet on India's future -- that India's greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security, that opening India's markets to the world will pave the way to greater regional and global prosperity, that Indian advances in science and technology will improve lives and advance human knowledge everywhere, and that India's vibrant, pluralistic democracy will produce measurable results and improvements for its citizens and inspire others to follow a similar path of openness and tolerance. So the Obama administration has expanded our bilateral partnership; actively supported India's Look East efforts, including through a new trilateral dialogue with India and Japan; and outlined a new vision for a more economically integrated and politically stable South and Central Asia, with India as a linchpin.
We are also forging a new partnership with Indonesia, the world's third-largest democracy, the world's most populous Muslim nation, and a member of the G-20. We have resumed joint training of Indonesian special forces units and signed a number of agreements on health, educational exchanges, science and technology, and defense. And this year, at the invitation of the Indonesian government, President Obama will inaugurate American participation in the East Asia Summit. But there is still some distance to travel -- we have to work together to overcome bureaucratic impediments, lingering historical suspicions, and some gaps in understanding each other's perspectives and interests.
Even as we strengthen these bilateral relationships, we have emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation, for we believe that addressing complex transnational challenges of the sort now faced by Asia requires a set of institutions capable of mustering collective action. And a more robust and coherent regional architecture in Asia would reinforce the system of rules and responsibilities, from protecting intellectual property to ensuring freedom of navigation, that form the basis of an effective international order. In multilateral settings, responsible behavior is rewarded with legitimacy and respect, and we can work together to hold accountable those who undermine peace, stability, and prosperity.
So the United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, mindful that our work with regional institutions supplements and does not supplant our bilateral ties. There is a demand from the region that America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions -- and it is in our interests as well that they be effective and responsive.
That is why President Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for the first time in November. To pave the way, the United States has opened a new U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN. Our focus on developing a more results-oriented agenda has been instrumental in efforts to address disputes in the South China Sea. In 2010, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, the United States helped shape a regionwide effort to protect unfettered access to and passage through the South China Sea, and to uphold the key international rules for defining territorial claims in the South China Sea's waters. Given that half the world's merchant tonnage flows through this body of water, this was a consequential undertaking. And over the past year, we have made strides in protecting our vital interests in stability and freedom of navigation and have paved the way for sustained multilateral diplomacy among the many parties with claims in the South China Sea, seeking to ensure disputes are settled peacefully and in accordance with established principles of international law.
We have also worked to strengthen APEC as a serious leaders-level institution focused on advancing economic integration and trade linkages across the Pacific. After last year's bold call by the group for a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific, President Obama will host the 2011 APEC Leaders' Meeting in Hawaii this November. We are committed to cementing APEC as the Asia-Pacific's premier regional economic institution, setting the economic agenda in a way that brings together advanced and emerging economies to promote open trade and investment, as well as to build capacity and enhance regulatory regimes. APEC and its work help expand U.S. exports and create and support high-quality jobs in the United States, while fostering growth throughout the region. APEC also provides a key vehicle to drive a broad agenda to unlock the economic growth potential that women represent. In this regard, the United States is committed to working with our partners on ambitious steps to accelerate the arrival of the Participation Age, where every individual, regardless of gender or other characteristics, is a contributing and valued member of the global marketplace.
In addition to our commitment to these broader multilateral institutions, we have worked hard to create and launch a number of "minilateral" meetings, small groupings of interested states to tackle specific challenges, such as the Lower Mekong Initiative we launched to support education, health, and environmental programs in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands Forum, where we are working to support its members as they confront challenges from climate change to overfishing to freedom of navigation. We are also starting to pursue new trilateral opportunities with countries as diverse as Mongolia, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, and South Korea. And we are setting our sights as well on enhancing coordination and engagement among the three giants of the Asia-Pacific: China, India, and the United States.
In all these different ways, we are seeking to shape and participate in a responsive, flexible, and effective regional architecture -- and ensure it connects to a broader global architecture that not only protects international stability and commerce but also advances our values.
Our emphasis on the economic work of APEC is in keeping with our broader commitment to elevate economic statecraft as a pillar of American foreign policy. Increasingly, economic progress depends on strong diplomatic ties, and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic ties. And naturally, a focus on promoting American prosperity means a greater focus on trade and economic openness in the Asia-Pacific. The region already generates more than half of global output and nearly half of global trade. As we strive to meet President Obama's goal of doubling exports by 2015, we are looking for opportunities to do even more business in Asia. Last year, American exports to the Pacific Rim totaled $320 billion, supporting 850,000 American jobs. So there is much that favors us as we think through this repositioning.
When I talk to my Asian counterparts, one theme consistently stands out: They still want America to be an engaged and creative partner in the region's flourishing trade and financial interactions. And as I talk with business leaders across our own nation, I hear how important it is for the United States to expand our exports and our investment opportunities in Asia's dynamic markets.
Last March in APEC meetings in Washington, and again in Hong Kong in July, I laid out four attributes that I believe characterize healthy economic competition: open, free, transparent, and fair. Through our engagement in the Asia-Pacific, we are helping to give shape to these principles and showing the world their value.
We are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports within five years and support an estimated 70,000 American jobs. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help South Korea's economy grow by 6 percent. It will level the playing field for U.S. auto companies and workers. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a South Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers that keep you from reaching new customers.
We are also making progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will bring together economies from across the Pacific -- developed and developing alike -- into a single trading community. Our goal is to create not just more growth, but better growth. We believe trade agreements need to include strong protections for workers, the environment, intellectual property, and innovation. They should also promote the free flow of information technology and the spread of green technology, as well as the coherence of our regulatory system and the efficiency of supply chains. Ultimately, our progress will be measured by the quality of people's lives -- whether men and women can work in dignity, earn a decent wage, raise healthy families, educate their children, and take hold of the opportunities to improve their own and the next generation's fortunes. Our hope is that a TPP agreement with high standards can serve as a benchmark for future agreements -- and grow to serve as a platform for broader regional interaction and eventually a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific.
Achieving balance in our trade relationships requires a two-way commitment. That's the nature of balance -- it can't be unilaterally imposed. So we are working through APEC, the G-20, and our bilateral relationships to advocate for more open markets, fewer restrictions on exports, more transparency, and an overall commitment to fairness. American businesses and workers need to have confidence that they are operating on a level playing field, with predictable rules on everything from intellectual property to indigenous innovation.
Asia's remarkable economic growth over the past decade and its potential for continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability that has long been guaranteed by the U.S. military, including more than 50,000 American servicemen and servicewomen serving in Japan and South Korea. The challenges of today's rapidly changing region -- from territorial and maritime disputes to new threats to freedom of navigation to the heightened impact of natural disasters -- require that the United States pursue a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture.
We are modernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia -- and our commitment on this is rock solid -- while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. For example, the United States will be deploying littoral combat ships to Singapore, and we are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together. And the United States and Australia agreed this year to explore a greater American military presence in Australia to enhance opportunities for more joint training and exercises. We are also looking at how we can increase our operational access in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region and deepen our contacts with allies and partners.
How we translate the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific oceans into an operational concept is a question that we need to answer if we are to adapt to new challenges in the region. Against this backdrop, a more broadly distributed military presence across the region will provide vital advantages. The United States will be better positioned to support humanitarian missions; equally important, working with more allies and partners will provide a more robust bulwark against threats or efforts to undermine regional peace and stability.
But even more than our military might or the size of our economy, our most potent asset as a nation is the power of our values -- in particular, our steadfast support for democracy and human rights. This speaks to our deepest national character and is at the heart of our foreign policy, including our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific region.
As we deepen our engagement with partners with whom we disagree on these issues, we will continue to urge them to embrace reforms that would improve governance, protect human rights, and advance political freedoms. We have made it clear, for example, to Vietnam that our ambition to develop a strategic partnership requires that it take steps to further protect human rights and advance political freedoms. Or consider Burma, where we are determined to seek accountability for human rights violations. We are closely following developments in Nay Pyi Taw and the increasing interactions between Aung San Suu Kyi and the government leadership. We have underscored to the government that it must release political prisoners, advance political freedoms and human rights, and break from the policies of the past. As for North Korea, the regime in Pyongyang has shown persistent disregard for the rights of its people, and we continue to speak out forcefully against the threats it poses to the region and beyond.
We cannot and do not aspire to impose our system on other countries, but we do believe that certain values are universal -- that people in every nation in the world, including in Asia, cherish them -- and that they are intrinsic to stable, peaceful, and prosperous countries. Ultimately, it is up to the people of Asia to pursue their own rights and aspirations, just as we have seen people do all over the world.
In the last decade, our foreign policy has transitioned from dealing with the post-Cold War peace dividend to demanding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those wars wind down, we will need to accelerate efforts to pivot to new global realities.
We know that these new realities require us to innovate, to compete, and to lead in new ways. Rather than pull back from the world, we need to press forward and renew our leadership. In a time of scarce resources, there's no question that we need to invest them wisely where they will yield the biggest returns, which is why the Asia-Pacific represents such a real 21st-century opportunity for us.
Other regions remain vitally important, of course. Europe, home to most of our traditional allies, is still a partner of first resort, working alongside the United States on nearly every urgent global challenge, and we are investing in updating the structures of our alliance. The people of the Middle East and North Africa are charting a new path that is already having profound global consequences, and the United States is committed to active and sustained partnerships as the region transforms. Africa holds enormous untapped potential for economic and political development in the years ahead. And our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere are not just our biggest export partners; they are also playing a growing role in global political and economic affairs. Each of these regions demands American engagement and leadership.
And we are prepared to lead. Now, I'm well aware that there are those who question our staying power around the world. We've heard this talk before. At the end of the Vietnam War, there was a thriving industry of global commentators promoting the idea that America was in retreat, and it is a theme that repeats itself every few decades. But whenever the United States has experienced setbacks, we've overcome them through reinvention and innovation. Our capacity to come back stronger is unmatched in modern history. It flows from our model of free democracy and free enterprise, a model that remains the most powerful source of prosperity and progress known to humankind. I hear everywhere I go that the world still looks to the United States for leadership. Our military is by far the strongest, and our economy is by far the largest in the world. Our workers are the most productive. Our universities are renowned the world over. So there should be no doubt that America has the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership in this century as we did in the last.
As we move forward to set the stage for engagement in the Asia-Pacific over the next 60 years, we are mindful of the bipartisan legacy that has shaped our engagement for the past 60. And we are focused on the steps we have to take at home -- increasing our savings, reforming our financial systems, relying less on borrowing, overcoming partisan division -- to secure and sustain our leadership abroad.
This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over the past two-and-a-half years, and we are committed to seeing it through as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.
希拉里·克林顿：美国的太平洋世纪
随着伊拉克战争接近尾声以及美国开始从阿富汗撤军，美国现在处于一个转折点。在过去10年中，我们向上述两个战区投入了巨大的资源。在今后10年中，我们对在哪里投入时间和精力需要做到灵活并有系统性，从而让我们自己处于最有利的地位，以保持我们的领导作用，保障我们的利益，推进我们的价值观。因此，今后10年美国外交方略的最重要的使命之一将是把大幅增加的投入——在外交、经济、战略和其他方面——锁定于亚太地区。
亚太地区已成为全球政治的一个关键的驱动力。这个地区从印度次大陆一直延伸到美洲西海岸，横跨太平洋和印度洋两个大洋，由于交通运输和战略因素而日益紧密地联系在一起。亚太地区的人口几乎占到世界总人口的一半。这个地区拥有很多全球经济的重要引擎，也有最大的温室气体排放国。该地区有我们的一些重要盟国，还有中国、印度和印度尼西亚等重要的新兴强国。
在亚太地区建设一个更成熟的安全和经济架构以增进稳定和繁荣之时，美国对这个地区的承诺至关重要。这将有助于建立起上述架构，同时使美国受益，让我们在整个世纪继续发挥领导作用，正如我国在二战过后致力于建立一个全面、持久的跨大西洋的机构和关系网络的努力已获得多倍收益，而且我们还在继续受益。现在正是美国作为一个太平洋大国作出同样投入的时候，这条战略路线是巴拉克．奥巴马总统在本届政府就任之初便确定的，现在已经产生效益。
由于伊拉克和阿富汗仍处于过渡时期，我们本国也面临着严重的经济挑战，美国政坛上有些人叫我们不要重新定位，而是掉头回家。他们寻求减少我们的国外参与，主张优先解决紧迫的国内问题。这些冲动是可以理解的，但也是受到误导的。那些说我们不能再继续参与全球事务的人完全是本末倒置——不参与的后果远非我们所能承受。从为美国企业打开新市场到遏制核扩散，再到保持商务和航运的自由通行，我们在国外的工作正是我们国内繁荣和安全的关键所在。60多年来，美国顶住了此类“回家”论调的牵引力和这些论点所隐含的零和逻辑。我们必须再次这样做。
在我们的边界之外，人们也在揣测美国的意图，不知道我们是否愿意继续参与并发挥领导作用。在亚洲，他们问我们是否真的会长期驻留，我们是否有可能再次因别处发生的事件而转移注意力，我们是否能够作出——并保持——可信的经济和战略承诺，以及我们是否能够以行动来落实这些承诺。答案是：我们能够而且一定会这样做。
利用亚洲的增长和活力是美国的经济和战略利益的核心，也是奥巴马总统确定的一项首要任务。亚洲开放的市场为美国进行投资、贸易及获取尖端技术提供了前所未有的机遇。我国国内的经济复苏将取决于出口和美国公司开发亚洲广阔和不断增长的消费基群的能力。在战略上，无论是通过捍卫南中国海的航行自由、应对北韩的扩散问题还是确保该地区主要国家的军事活动的透明度，保障整个亚太地区的和平与安全对全球的发展越来越至关重要。
正如亚洲对美国的未来极其重要一样，一个积极参与的美国对亚洲的未来也极其重要。该地区渴求我们的领导作用和我们的商业贸易——也许比现代史上任何时期都更迫切。我们是在该地区拥有一个强大的联盟网络的唯一大国，没有领土方面的野心，却有维护共同利益的长期业绩。与我们的盟友一起，我们几十年来保障了地区安全——在亚洲的海上航道巡逻并维护稳定——这反过来又帮助创造了经济增长的条件。我们通过刺激经济生产力、增进社会权益及扩大人民与人民之间的联系，已经帮助整个地区数十亿人融入全球经济。我们是一个主要的贸易和投资伙伴、让太平洋两岸的工人和企业受益的创新源泉、每年接待35万亚洲学生的东道国、以及开放市场的先行者和普世人权的倡导者。
奥巴马总统在整个美国政府部门领导了一项多方面的、坚持不懈的努力，充分支持我们在太平洋地区不可替代的作用。这常常是一种默默无闻的努力。我们的很多工作并没有成为头版新闻，不仅因为工作的性质——长期投资不如眼前的危机更引人注目——还因为世界其他地区不断爆出头条新闻。
作为国务卿，我打破传统，在首次正式出国访问时便前往亚洲。在随后的七次行程中，我有幸亲眼看到该地区发生的迅速转变，突显了美国的未来与亚太地区的未来是多么紧密地交织在一起。从战略上转向该地区，在理念上与我们保障和保持美国的全球领导力的总体努力一致。这一转变的成功要求两党必须保持并增进关于亚太地区对我们国家利益的重要意义的共识；我们寻求发扬几十年来两党历届总统和国务卿所开创的参与世界事务的深厚传统。这还要求必须明智地推行一项连贯一致并能兼顾我们各项决策的全球性影响的区域战略。
这种区域战略是个什么样子？首先，它要求长期地致力于我所说的“前沿部署”（forward-deployed)外交。这意味着继续把我们的各种外交资源——包括我们最高级别的官员、我们的发展专家、我们的跨部门团队和我们的永久资产——分派到亚太地区的每个国家和每个角落。我们的战略必须顾及并适应在亚洲各地不断出现的迅速和显著的变化。鉴于这一点，我们的工作将遵循六个关键的行动方针：加强双边安全联盟；深化我们与新兴大国的工作关系，其中包括中国；参与区域性多边机构；扩大贸易和投资；打造一种有广泛基础的军事存在；促进民主和人权。
由于我们独一无二的地理特点，美国既是大西洋国家，也是太平洋大国。我们对与欧洲的伙伴关系及其一切成果感到自豪。我们现在的挑战是建立跨太平洋的伙伴关系和机构网，使之与我们的跨大西洋网络一样持久，并与美国的利益和价值观一致。对于我们在所有这些方面的努力，这是一个试金石。
我们与日本、韩国、澳大利亚、菲律宾和泰国的条约联盟是我们转向亚太战略的支点。这些联盟已经确保了半个多世纪的地区和平与安全，为该地区引人注目的经济崛起构建了有利的环境。在安全挑战不断演变之际，它们充分利用我们的地区存在，增强我们的地区领导力。
尽管这些联盟非常成功，但我们不能仅满足于维持这种关系，而需要不断更新以适应日新月异的世界。在这方面，奥巴马政府以三项核心原则为指引。首先，我们必须在我们联盟的核心目标上保持政治共识。其次，我们必须确保我们的联盟具有灵活性和适应能力，以便成功应对新的挑战和把握新的机遇。第三，我们必须保证我们联盟的防御能力和通讯基础设施在运作上和物质上能够切实阻遏各种各样的国家和非国家实体的挑衅。
与日本的联盟是该地区和平与稳定的基石，它表明奥巴马政府如何贯彻这些原则。从航行自由到开放市场和公平竞争，我们对稳定的地区秩序和清晰的通行规则怀有共同的愿景。我们已达成一项新的约定，其内容包括由日本政府出资50多亿美元，以确保美国军队长久驻防日本，同时扩大联合的情报、监测和侦察活动，从而阻遏对地区安全的挑战并迅速作出反应，以及共享情报以应对网络安全威胁。我们已缔结开放天空协定，用以增进企业接触和民众联系；启动关于亚太事务的战略对话，并作为阿富汗的两个最大捐助国携手合作。
同样，我们与韩国的联盟正在加强，操作上越来越一体化，并且继续发展两国的联合能力，以阻遏和应对北韩的挑衅。我们已就一项计划达成协议，确保操作控制权在战时成功过渡，并预期《韩美自由贸易协定》（Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement）将获顺利通过。通过我们在20国集团（G-20）与核安全峰会（Nuclear Security Summit）的合作，以及我们在海地和阿富汗的共同行动，我们的联盟已走向全球化。
我们也在扩大与澳大利亚的联盟，把我们的关系从一种太平洋伙伴关系扩展到跨越印度洋和太平洋的伙伴关系，实际上，这已经是全球性的伙伴关系。从网络安全到阿富汗，从阿拉伯觉醒到加强亚太的地区架构，澳大利亚的建议和投入都是不可或缺的。在东南亚，我们正在续延和加强与菲律宾和泰国的联盟，例如增加舰船到访菲律宾的次数，通过我们在棉兰老岛（Mindanao）的联合特别行动队（Joint Special Operations Task Force）确保成功训练菲律宾反恐部队。在我们历史最悠久的亚洲条约伙伴泰国，我们正努力建立太平洋地区的区域人道主义和赈灾活动中枢。
在根据新的需要更新联盟关系的同时，我们也在建立新的伙伴关系以解决共同面临的问题。我们主动扩展与中国、印度、印度尼西亚、新加坡、新西兰、马来西亚、蒙古、越南、文莱和太平洋岛国的关系，这些都是更广泛的努力的一部分，旨在确保美国在该地区奉行更全面的战略和参与。我们正邀请这些新伙伴与我们一起构建一套基于规则的区域及全球秩序并参与其中。
当然，这些新伙伴中最引人瞩目的国家之一是中国。与以往获得发展的许多国家一样，作为美国帮助建立和努力维续的基于规则的开放系统的组成部份，中国也实现了繁荣发展。今天，与中国的关系是美国有史以来必须管理的最具挑战性和影响最大的双边关系之一，需要进行审慎、稳定、动态的管理。我们对中国的方针是立足现实，注重成效，忠实于我们的原则和利益。
众所周知，担忧和误解仍然在太平洋两岸徘徊不去。我们国内的一些人把中国的进步视为对美国的威胁；而在中国的一些人担心美国会试图遏制中国的发展。我们反对上述两种观点。事实是，一个欣欣向荣的美国对中国有利；一个欣欣向荣的中国也对美国有利。通过合作而不是对抗，我们两国均能显著获益。但是，不能仅靠愿望来建设两国关系。它需要我们双方更加始终如一地把积极的言词转化成有效的合作，而且更关键的是，我们必须履行各自的全球责任与义务。今后我们之间的关系是否能发挥潜能正是取决于这些因素。我们也必须坦诚对待我们之间的分歧。在我们从事我们必须为之共同努力的紧迫工作时，我们将坚定并果断地解决这些问题。同时，我们也必须避免那些不切实际的期望。
在最近的两年半中，我的重点工作之一是确定并扩大我们两国具有共同利益的领域，与中国一起努力建立互信，并鼓励中国在解决全球性难题时采取积极行动。这也是财政部长盖特纳（Timothy Geithner）和我启动两国间战略与经济对话（Strategic and Economic Dialogue）的原因，这一对话把两国的数十个机构汇集到一起，磋商最为紧迫的双边问题，包括安全、能源和人权问题在内，是两国政府间迄今最具深度与广度的对话。
我们还努力增加透明度，降低两国军队之间发生误判与失误的风险。美国与国际社会看到了中国进行军事现代化及扩充军备的努力，我们希望中国澄清这样做的意图。两国军队之间的交往可增进透明度，双方都将从这种持久和实质性的交往中获益。因此，我们期待北京克服时有的勉强态度，与我们一起努力建立一个可持久的军队与军队间的对话机制。此外，我们必须共同努力来加强战略安全对话（Strategic Security Dialogue），这一对话把军队和文职领导人汇集到一起，讨论诸如海事安全和网络安全等敏感问题。
在我们共同努力建立互信的同时，我们决心与中国一起共同应对至关重要的地区性与全球性安全问题。因此，我经常——往往是在非正式场合——与我的中国同行戴秉国国务委员和杨洁篪外长会面，就北韩、阿富汗、巴基斯坦和伊朗问题以及南中国海的开发等重要挑战进行坦率磋商。
在经济领域，美国与中国必须密切合作以保障全球未来的强劲、可持续且平衡的发展。在全球经历了金融危机后，美国与中国通过20国集团有效地合作，合力把全球经济从濒于崩溃的境地挽回。我们必须继续增进这种合作。美国企业需要公平的机会向中国日益扩大的市场出口，扩大出口将能增加在美国本土的就业机会，同时保证美国在中国的500亿美元投资能够为有助于增强在全球的竞争力的新的市场和投资机会奠定一个稳固的基础。同时，中国企业希望能够从美国购买更多的高科技产品，在美国进行更多的投资，并获得与市场经济同等的准入条件。我们能够为实现这些目标共同努力，但中国仍然需要采取重要的改革步骤。具体而言，我们正在努力要求中国停止对美国和其他外国公司或它们的创新技术的不公平的歧视行为；撤除对本国企业的优惠待遇；并终止那些不利于甚或盗取外国知识产权的行为。我们希望中国采取步骤，允许人民币对美元以及对中国其他主要贸易伙伴的货币的汇率更快地升值。我们相信，这些改革将不仅有利于我们两国（这些改革步骤确实将有助于中国实现其包括扩大内需在内的五年计划目标），同时还将有利于全球的经济平衡和可预见性以及更广泛的繁荣。
当然，我们已在公开和非公开场合十分明确地表示了我们对人权的严正关注。当我们看到有关公益律师、作家、艺术家和其他人员被拘留或失踪的报道时，美国以公开和非公开的方式表达我们对人权的关注。我们向我们的中国同行指出，严格遵守国际法和实行更开放的政治体制将为中国奠定基础，带来更大的稳定与增长，并将增强中国的合作伙伴的信心。否则，中国将给自身发展造成不必要的限制。
说到底，美中关系的发展没有指导手册可循。然而，利益攸关，不容失败。我们在前进过程中，将继续把同中国的关系置于一个更广泛的地区性的安全同盟、经济网络和社会纽带的框架内。
我们将与之密切合作的主要新兴大国包括印度和印度尼西亚。这两国也是亚洲最具活力的重要的民主大国。 奥巴马政府谋求同两国发展更广泛、更深入和更明确的关系。从印度洋经马六甲海峡到太平洋的这一海域分布着世界上最活跃的贸易和能源航道。印度和印度尼西亚两国人口总和已占世界总人口的近四分之一。它们是全球经济的关键动力，是美国的重要合作伙伴，并正在日益成为该地区和平与安全的核心贡献者。它们的重要性很可能在未来与日俱增。
奥巴马总统去年对印度国会表示，印度与美国之间的关系是21世纪具有决定意义的伙伴合作关系之一，并且基于共同的价值观和利益。双方都仍有一些障碍需要克服，有一些问题有待回答；但是，美国对印度的未来作出的战略性预测是：印度在国际舞台上发挥更大作用将有助于推进和平与安全；印度向世界开放市场将为实现地区乃至世界进一步繁荣铺平道路；印度的科学技术进步将改善人民生活并在各地促进人类知识进步；印度充满活力、多元的民主体制将带来实际成果，改善本国人民的生活，同时激励其他国家走上相似的开放与宽容之路。因此，奥巴马政府扩大了我们的双边关系；积极支持印度的“东向”（Look East）努力，包括与印度和日本的新三边对话；并且勾画出一个以印度为支柱的经济更融合、政治更稳定的南亚和中亚地区的新愿景。
我们也在与印度尼西亚缔结新的伙伴合作关系。印尼是世界第三大民主体，是世界上穆斯林人口最多的国家，同时也是20国集团成员。我们已恢复了对印尼特种部队的联合培训，并与该国签署了数项卫生健康、教育交流、科学技术及防务协议。今年，应印尼政府之邀，美国将以奥巴马总统为代表首次参加东亚峰会（East Asia Summit）。不过，还有一段路程要走——我们必须共同努力消除一些官僚障碍、历史遗留的猜疑以及在理解彼此视角与利益上的某些差异。
即便在我们强化这些双边关系的时候，我们也强调了多边合作的重要性，因为我们认为，解决亚洲如今所面临的这类复杂的跨国挑战需要一系列有能力采取集体行动的机构的参与。亚洲建立起一个更有力、更协调的地区构架将会加强规则与责任体制，包括保护知识产权和确保航运自由，而这将为有效的国际秩序奠定基础。在多边环境下，负责任的行为会赢得合法性并受到尊重，同时让我们可以共同向破坏和平、稳定和繁荣的人追究责任。
因此，美国已经采取行动全面接触或参与该地区的多边机制，如东南亚国家联盟（Association of Southeast Asian Nations，ASEAN）和亚太经合组织（Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation，APEC）等。我们知道，我们与地区机制的合作旨在辅助而不是取代我们的双边关系。该地区要求美国在这些机制的议程制定中发挥积极作用——而这些机制富有效力且积极负责也同样符合我们的利益。
因此，奥巴马总统将于11月第一次参加东亚峰会。作为一项基础工作，美国已在雅加达设立了新的美国驻东盟使团，并与东盟签署了《友好合作条约》（Treaty of Amity and Cooperation）。我们把制定一项更加注重结果的议程作为重点，这对于解决南中国海争端的努力起到了推动作用。在2010年于河内举行的东盟地区论坛（ASEAN Regional Forum）上，美国帮助展开了一项地区性努力，保护各国不受阻碍地进入南中国海及在其间通航，支持在南中国海海域划定领海界限的关键国际规则。鉴于世界二分之一的商用货轮行经这片水域，这是一项影响重大的努力。在过去一年中，我们为保护我们在通航稳定和自由的切身利益方面取得了长足进步，并为对南中国海提出所有权要求的各方展开持久的多边外交铺平了道路，努力确保按照国际法既定的原则和平解决争端。
我们还努力加强亚太经合组织，使之成为一个致力于推进整个太平洋地区的经济一体化和贸易联系的实质性领导机构。在该组织去年大胆呼吁建立亚太自由贸易区之后，奥巴马总统将于今年11月在夏威夷主持召开2011年亚太经合组织领导人会议。我们致力于巩固亚太经合组织作为亚太地区首屈一指的区域经济机构的作用，制定经济议程，从而带动发达和新兴经济体共同推动开放的贸易和投资，同时建设能力并加强监管机制。亚太经合组织及其从事的工作有助于扩大美国的出口以及在美国创造并扶持高质量的就业机会，同时促进整个亚太地区的经济增长。亚太经合组织还提供了一项关键性手段，推进释放妇女所拥有的经济增长潜能的广泛议程。在这方面，美国致力于与我国的合作伙伴共同采取雄心勃勃的步骤，以加速“参与时代”（Participation Age）的到来——届时每一个人，不分性别或其他特征，都成为为全球市场做出贡献的重要成员。
除了对这些规模较大的多边机制的承诺外，我们还付出了巨大努力，发起并召开一系列“小型多边”会议，即希望解决具体问题的国家召开的小型会议，例如我们发起的湄公河下游行动计划（Lower Mekong Initiative）。该计划支持柬埔寨、老挝、泰国和越南的教育、卫生和环境项目。再如太平洋岛国论坛，我们在论坛上努力支持其成员应对从气候变化到过度捕捞及通航自由等带来的挑战。我们还着手寻求与蒙古、印度尼西亚、日本、哈萨克斯坦和韩国等不同国家建立新的三边关系的机会。我们也希望在亚太地区的三大强国中国、印度和美国之间推进协调和接触。
通过所有这些不同的方式，我们力求塑造并参与一个反应迅速、灵活、有效的区域性架构，并确保它与一个更广泛的全球架构连通，该架构不仅保护国际稳定和国际商贸，而且能推进我们的价值观。
我们对亚太经合组织的经济工作的重视与我们把经济治理方略提升至美国外交政策一大支柱的更广泛的承诺是一致的。经济进步日益依赖牢固的外交关系，而外交进展则取决于牢固的经济关系。注重增进美国的繁荣也自然而然地意味着更高度地注重太平洋地区的贸易和经济开放。该地区的产出已超过全球总产出的一半，该地区的贸易也占全球总贸易的将近一半。在我们力争实现奥巴马总统到2015年将出口翻一番的目标之时，我们正在寻求在亚洲扩大商务的机会。去年，美国对太平洋沿岸地区的出口总额为3200亿美元，支撑着85万个就业岗位。因此，在我们审议此次重新定位时，有很多对我们有利的因素。
当我与我的亚洲同行们交谈的时侯，总会有一个主题突显出来：他们仍然希望美国在亚洲地区蓬勃发展的贸易和金融交往中成为一个参与其中并发挥创造性作用的合作伙伴。在我与我国各地企业界领导人的交谈中，我了解到向亚洲蓬勃的市场扩大我们的出口和投资机会对美国是多么的重要。
在今年3月在华盛顿以及后来于7月在香港举行的亚太经合组织会议上，我阐述了我认为健康的经济竞争应当具备的四个特征：开放、自由、透明、公平。通过我们在亚太地区的参与，我们正在帮助落实这些原则，并向世人展现出它们的价值。
我们正在谋求达成新型的贸易协议，使之在开拓新市场的同时提升公平竞争的标准。例如，《韩国与美国自由贸易协定》（Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement）将在五年内取消美国95%的消费品和工业出口产品关税，支持大约7万个美国就业岗位。仅消除关税一项就可能为美国出口产品带来100亿美元以上的增长，并促使韩国经济增长6%。它将为美国汽车公司和员工打造出公平的竞争环境。所以，无论你们是美国机械制造商，还是韩国化学品出口商，这项协定都减少了阻碍你们获得新客户的壁垒。
我们在建立跨太平洋伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership）方面也取得了进展。它将使太平洋地区的经济体——无论是发达还是发展中经济体——汇聚一起，形成一个统一贸易体。我们的目标不只是取得更大的增长，还要取得更好的增长。我们认为，贸易协议需要包含对工人、环境、知识产权和创新的严格保护。它们还应该促进信息技术的自由流动和绿色技术的推广普及，提高我们的监管体系的协调性和供应链的效率。我们取得的进步最终要以人民的生活质量为衡量尺度——要看男女公民能否有尊严地工作、获得体面的报酬、抚养健康的家庭、教育子女、并且能够掌握机会改善自己和下一代的命运。我们希望，具有高标准的跨太平洋伙伴关系协议能够成为今后各种协议的一个基准——并且发展成带来更广泛的地区互动的平台，最终形成亚太自由贸易区。
取得我们贸易关系中的平衡需要有双向的承诺。这是平衡的本质所在——它不能单方面强加于人。因此，我们正在通过亚太经合组织、20国集团和我们的各种双边关系提倡进一步开放市场、减少出口限制、增加透明度、以及对于公平的整体承诺。美国的企业和工人需要对他们在一个公平竞争环境中经营抱有信心，从知识产权到自主创新——一切都有可循之规。
亚洲经济在过去10年里的非凡增长及其在未来持续增长的潜力依赖于长期的安全与稳定，美国军队——包括5万多名在日本和韩国服役的美国男女军人——为提供这项保障做出了贡献。今天这个快速变化的地区所面临的各种挑战——从领土和海事争端、对航行自由的新威胁、直至自然灾害加剧的影响——要求美国奉行一个在地理分布上更合理、运作上更具弹性、政治上更可持续的军力态势。
我们正在把与东北亚地区传统盟友的基地安排现代化——我们对此的承诺坚如磐石；与此同时，我们正在加强我们在东南亚和印度洋地区的存在。例如，美国将在新加坡部署美国濒海战斗舰（U.S. Littoral Combat Ships），我们还在研究增加我们两国军队协同训练和行动机会的其他途径。美国和澳大利亚今年同意探索如何扩大美国在澳大利亚的军事部署，以增加更多的联合训练和演习机会。我们还在审视如何能够增加我们在东南亚和印度洋地区的行动通道及深化我们与盟国和合作伙伴的接触。
如果我们要适应在该地区面临的新挑战，如何把印度洋和太平洋之间日益增长的关系变成一个操作性理念是我们需要回答的一个问题。在这一背景下，在整个地区作出更广的军事部署将提供极为重要的有利条件。美国将能更好地支持人道救援；同样重要的是，与更多的盟国和伙伴开展合作将提供更强大的保障，以应对各种威胁或破坏地区和平与稳定的行为。
与我们的军事力量或经济规模相比，我们作为一个国家所拥有的最有影响力的资产是我们的价值观的巨大威力，特别是我们对民主与人权的坚定不移的支持。它显现了我们最深厚的民族性格，是我国外交政策的核心，包括我们向亚太地区的战略转移。
在我们深化与在这些问题上和我们持有不同观点的伙伴的接触时，我们将继续敦促他们实施改善国家治理、保护人权和推进政治自由的改革。例如，我们向越南明确表示，我们发展战略伙伴关系的强烈愿望要求它必须采取步骤进一步保护人权和推进政治自由。再如缅甸，我们决心对那里侵犯人权的行为追究责任。我们密切关注内比都（Nay Pyi Taw）的局势发展及昂山素季（Aung San Suu Kyi）与政府领导层之间不断增加的互动。我们向缅甸政府强调，必须释放政治犯，推进政治自由和人权，同过去的政策决裂。至于北韩，平壤政权一贯漠视其人民的权利，我们继续有力地公开谴责北韩对地区与世界构成的威胁。
我们不能也不会寻求将我们的制度强加给别的国家，但我们坚持认为，某些价值观是普遍的——为包括亚洲在内的全世界每个国家的人民所珍视——这些价值观是建设稳定、和平和繁荣的国家不可或缺的条件。最终，应由亚洲人民来追求自己的权利和愿望，就像我们在全世界看到的一样。
在过去10年中，我国外交政策经历了转型，从处理后冷战时期的和平红利到履行在伊拉克和阿富汗作出的巨大承诺。随着这两场战争逐渐平息，我们将需要加快转折，以适应新的全球现实。
我们知道这些新的现实要求我们创新、竞争和以新的方式发挥领导作用。我们不应减少对世界事务的参与，而是需要奋勇向前，继续发挥领导作用。毫无疑问，在资源稀缺的时期，我们需要明智地使用这些资源，以期获取最大的回报。这就是为什么亚太地区在21世纪为我们提供真正的机遇的原因。
当然，其他地区依然十分重要。我国多数传统盟国所在的欧洲仍然是我们首先依赖的伙伴，在几乎每一个紧迫的全球挑战中都与美国并肩努力，我们也正为更新我们的同盟架构投入资源。中东北非人民正在规划一条新的道路，并已产生意义深远的全球影响。随着这一地区发生深刻变化，美国正致力于与之建立积极长久的伙伴关系。在经济与政治发展方面，非洲在未来年代中拥有尚未挖掘的巨大潜力。另外，我们在西半球的邻国不仅是我们最大的出口贸易伙伴，而且在全球经济与政治事务中也正在发挥越来越大的作用。所有这些地区都需要美国的参与和领导。
我们已经做好发挥领导作用的准备。我知道，有一些人对我们能否在世界上长期保持力量表示怀疑。我们以前就听到过这种言论。越战结束时曾出现一个盛极一时的全球评论员行业，他们竭力宣扬美国在退却，这种论调每几十年就出现一次。但是，无论美国在何时经历挫折，我们都通过发明和创新渡过难关。在现代史上，我们的复兴能力是无与伦比的。它植根于我们的自由民主和自由创业模式，今天，这个模式仍然是人类有史以来最强大的繁荣与进步的源泉。不管我去哪里，人们都告诉我世界依然期待美国发挥领导作用。我们的军力遥遥领先，我们的经济规模远超世界上任何其他国家。我们的工人拥有最强的生产力，我们的大学饮誉全球。因此，毫无疑问，美国有能力在本世纪保障和延续我们的全球领导地位，正如上个世纪一样。
在我们向前推进、为今后60年在亚太地区的参与奠定基础之际，我们不忘过去60年中主导了这种参与的两党传统。目前，我们专注于在国内必须采取的步骤——增加储蓄、改革金融体系、减少对举债的依赖、化解两党的争议——以获得和保持我们在国外的领导地位。
这种转折远非易事，但我们在过去两年半的时间里已经为之铺平了道路，我们有决心完成这个转折，这是我们这个时代最重要的外交努力之一。
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