作者：前北約秘書長 Javier Solana 2012年11月26日 project syndicate
翻譯：车失/观察者网
亚太还是中东？对于目前的美国来说，这是一个根本性的战略命题。美国总统奥巴马访问金边之际，正值加沙地区发生暴力流血冲突，这恰好反映了摆在美国面前的两难选择。奥巴马被迫将许多时间花费在与埃及、以色列等国领导人的磋商上，且让美国国务卿希拉里从亚太赶往中东，敦促加沙地区达成停火协议；由此，美国难以把外交政策的重心放在向亚太地区战略“转移”上来。
中东和亚太这两个需要美国高度关注的焦点地区，前者代表着过去，后者代表着未来。一方面，美国已身陷中东的流沙数十年；另一方面，关于“中国崛起”的话题也开始时常出现在美国大选激烈的论战中。在中东，永世不休的巴以冲突、不稳定的伊拉克局势、阿拉伯之春、叙利亚内战、伊朗核僵局，都需要美国的关注。
一旦伊朗核危机爆发，美国的主要外交政策将无法优先向亚太地区进行“战略转移”。但如果美国能够与伊朗通过外交手段解决分歧，将有可能如奥巴马所愿，顺利下调中东地区的战略优先权。所以核心的问题是，随着美国对中东地区的能源依赖性逐渐下降，山姆大叔会再次卷入中东战争吗？
确实，一场非常规的氢碳化合物领域革命，尤其是页岩气和页岩油的出现，将在全球范围产生巨大影响。国际能源机构最近发布的预期显示，美国将在2020年之前成为世界最大产油国，在2030年前成为世界头号综合能源生产国。对美国来说，能源上的自给自足无疑成为了渐进式撤离中东最好的借口；只要能获得能源上的独立，美国就可以将重心放在亚太地区。
出于维护国际能源价格稳定和与以色列的盟友关系等方面的考虑，美国尚无法完全从中东地区的纷扰中抽离，但美国早在奥巴马首届任期的早期就开始向亚太战略转移，在美军开始撤离伊拉克之前，国务卿希拉里.克林顿就宣布了美国的战略调整。奥巴马连任美国总统后，首次外事访问的目的地是缅甸、泰国和柬埔寨——这样的选择不讨中国的喜欢，因为奥巴马出访的三个国家都是东盟成员国，其中缅甸在走上民主化转型道路之前，曾经一直是中国的亲密盟友。
毋庸置疑，亚洲的经济正在高速成长，但地区内因强烈的民族主义而出现的紧张局势表明，在加强经济集成化的同时，还需建立区域安全结构。正如美国学者李侃如（Kenneth Lieberthal）和北京大学国际关系学院院长王缉思在近期发布的论文中提到的，“战略互疑”让局势更加错综复杂。
二十一世纪的世界级大国建立战略互信将是保证国际体系和谐运作的关键所在。那么如何做到战略互信呢？2020年之前，中国用油的四分之三将来自中东地区，要在战略互信的方向迈进一步，中国就应秉持合作理念，解决中东地区问题。2013年1月，以色列大选结束之后，伊朗问题将被再次搬上奥巴马的外交政策头号议程。同年6月，伊朗国内也将举行总统选举，美国若此刻对伊朗进行军事干预，将危及地区乃至全球局势稳定。一旦阿拉伯世界、俄罗斯和中国被迫选择站队，全球各极间关系将迅速恶化，危及亚太局势。
除伊朗问题外，飘忽莫测的中东局势迫切需要解决方案。最近哈马斯和以色列间的暴力冲突昭示了地区进行重新和谈的重要性。叙利亚内战在地区内卷入多方势力，俨然成为逊尼派穆斯林（沙特等海湾国家、土耳其和埃及）和什叶派穆斯林（伊朗、黎巴嫩真主党）争夺地区主导权之战的试炼场。
伊朗的领导人似乎相信，在过去十余年中为战争付出了高昂的经济和人员代价美国，将尽力避免再次进行军事干预。美国公众们的观点似乎也印证了这一点。美国智库芝加哥全球事务委员会近期的一项民意调查显示，67%的美国人认为伊拉克战争打得不值得；69%的美国人认为阿富汗战争无法让美国走出了恐怖主义的阴影；71%的美国人则表示，伊拉克战争的经验说明美国需要更为慎重地动用武力。
美国不太可能再把亿万美元砸在海外冒险的死胡同里；同时，越来越多的国际制裁也让伊朗的领导人四面楚歌，伊朗国内经济每况愈下。双方或许都将意识到，至少从目前来看——谈判才是最佳出路。
和平解决伊朗问题将帮助美国完成战略重心向亚太地区的转移。中国或许不希望看到这样的结果，但为了保证中东地区的能源供应，中国必须合作。不管怎样，一旦中东地区再发生冲突，未来数十年内该地区的国际关系都将支离破碎，这是美国和中国都不愿看到的最糟糕的结果。作者索拉納，曾擔任西班牙外交部長，北約秘書長，歐盟外交和安全政策的高級代表等職。他目前擔任的ESADE中心的全球經濟和地緣政治和美國布魯金斯學會高級研究員傑出。
America’s Perilous Pivot
by Javier Solana 2012年11月26日project syndicate
The Pacific or the Middle East? For the United States, that is now the primary strategic question. The violence in Gaza, coming as President Barack Obama was meeting Asia’s leaders in Phnom Penh, perfectly encapsulates America’s dilemma. Instead of being able to focus on US foreign policy’s “pivot” to Asia, Obama was forced to spend many hours in conversation with the leaders of Egypt and Israel, and to dispatch Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from Asia, in order to facilitate a cease-fire in Gaza.
Of the two geopolitical focal points demanding America’s attention, one represents the future and the other the past. Whereas Asia played an important role in a US presidential election campaign that was marked by often-heated references to China’s rise, the Middle East has kept the US bogged down for decades. In addition to the eternal Israel-Palestine conflict, Iraq’s instability, the Arab Spring, Syria’s civil war, and the ongoing nuclear standoff with Iran all demand America’s attention.
If the Iran crisis were to boil over, the pivot to Asia would no longer be America’s main foreign-policy priority. But if the dispute with Iran is resolved diplomatically, the Middle East might, perhaps, be relegated to a position of lesser importance, as Obama clearly desires. The question, therefore, is whether the US will find itself drawn into another war in a region on which it depends less and less for energy.
Indeed, the revolution in non-conventional hydrocarbons, particularly shale gas and oil, which the International Energy Agency recently predicted would make the US the world’s largest oil producer by 2020, and the top energy producer overall by 2030, will have enormous global repercussions. For the US, energy self-sufficiency is the perfect excuse for a phased withdrawal from the Middle East; freed from energy dependency, America should be able to concentrate on the Pacific.
Although maintaining stable global energy prices and its alliance with Israel means that the US cannot cut itself off completely from the Middle East’s troubles, the shift in focus to Asia began early in Obama’s first administration, with Clinton announcing America’s strategic reorientation even before US troops began withdrawing from Iraq. Following his re-election, Obama’s first foreign visit was to Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia – a choice that cannot have pleased China, as all three are ASEAN members, while Myanmar was, until it began its democratic transition, a close Chinese ally.
Asia is, of course, experiencing rapid economic growth, but managing the region’s strong nationalist tensions calls for the creation of regional security structures, together with closer economic integration. Complicating matters even more is what US scholar Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, the dean of international studies at Peking University, called in a recent paper for the Brookings Institution “strategic distrust.”
Cultivating strategic trust between the twenty-first century’s leading powers will be fundamental to the international system’s harmonious functioning. But how can this be achieved? As China will be importing three-quarters of its oil from the Middle East by 2020, one step forward would be China’s cooperation in finding solutions to the region’s problems.
After the January 2013 Israeli elections, Iran will again move to the top of Obama’s foreign-policy agenda. Military intervention in Iran – which itself will be holding a presidential election in June – would incite not only regional, but global, instability. The Arab world, Russia, and China would be forced to take sides, straining global relations between the different poles of power and raising tensions in the Pacific. So China has a large strategic interest in working with the US to avoid a showdown.
Beyond Iran, the volatile situation throughout the Middle East urgently demands solutions. The latest eruption of violent conflict between Hamas and Israel underscores the importance of reviving the peace process. Syria’s civil war, in which a growing number of regional players have become involved, is beginning to look increasingly like a trial run for all-out war between Sunni Muslims (Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, Turkey, and Egypt) and Shia Muslims (Iran and Hezbollah) for regional dominance.
Iran’s leaders appear to believe that the US, having incurred extremely high economic and human costs from more than a decade of war, would rather avoid another military intervention. US public opinion seems to confirm this. A recent survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs indicated that 67% of Americans believe that the Iraq war was not worthwhile. Moreover, 69% do not believe that the US is safer from terrorism since the war in Afghanistan, and 71% say that the experience in Iraq shows that the US should take greater care in how it uses force.
But, if Americans seem unlikely to be willing to invest billions of dollars in another dead-end foreign adventure, Iran’s leaders, for their part, are increasingly hemmed in by international sanctions, which are beginning to wreak havoc on the country’s economy. Both sides may believe that their best option – at least for now – is to negotiate.
Peaceful resolution of the Iranian question would help the US to complete its shift toward Asia. China may not wish for that outcome, but its own vital interest in the security of Middle East energy supplies should compel it to cooperate. After all, another Middle East conflict would poison and distort relations in the region for decades, which would be the worst of all possible consequences – for the US and China alike.
Javier Solana was Foreign Minister of Spain, Secretary-General of NATO, and EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. He is currently President of the ESADE Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics and Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
